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JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN EMERGING
FEDERAL SYSTEMS:' THE MARSHALL
COURT AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE
HERBERT

A. JOHNSON*

INTRODUCTION

In the second act of Twelfth Night, Shakespeare suggests that
fame, or greatness, derives from three sources, "some are born
great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust
upon [them]." 2 Without in any way detracting from John
Marshall's natural abilities or his achievements as a lawyer,
diplomat, politician, and judge, there is much to be gained by
* Ernest F. Hollings Chair Professor of Constitutional Law, University of
South Carolina School of Law. A.B., M.A., and Ph.D., Columbia University;
LL.B., New York Law School. Professors Anthony Arnull and L. Neville
Brown of the University of Birmingham Faculty of Law provided valued
assistance in the early stages of researching this article. Professor Erwin
Deutsch, visiting professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law,
and a member of the Law Faculty at the University of Gottingen, also
provided valued suggestions and corrections. I have also profited from
comments made by colleagues at a Faculty Colloquium held on September 30,
1999 at the University of South Carolina School of Law. However, even the
accumulated expertise and wisdom of these kind friends could not possibly
save this novice at EU Community Law from errors of fact and interpretation,
for which he begs the reader's indulgence.
1. The term "federal system" is technically not applicable to the European
Union, which by law exists as a group of independent states united in
economic and political interests by a series of multilateral treaties. However,
the term is used in recognition of the de facto situation that the supranational
operation of those treaties, and the submission of the Member States to the
terms of the treaties, results in a relationship which is similar to that existing
in de jure federal nations, such as the United States of America.
* Milton R. Underwood, Professor of Law and Professor of History,
Vanderbilt University. I am deeply indebted to Herman Belz, Jon W. Bruce,
Michael G. Collins, Robert Faulkner, John C.P. Goldberg, Mark A. Graber,
David Schultz, and Nicholas Zeppos who read earlier drafts of this essay and
offered valuable comments.
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT, act 2, sc. 5.
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considering the- unique opportunities that facilitated his rise to
fame as "The Great Chief Justice." Charles Hobson points out that
Marshall's place in the Revolutionary generation made it possible
for him to play a role in establishing the Federal Constitution in
1787 and 1788, and yet live long enough to lead the next
generation in giving shape and substance to its terms. Quoting
Gordon Wood, Hobson notes that Marshall benefited from the
early Republic's development of the "independent judiciary" as a
means toward checking the excesses of popular government.3
Indeed, John Marshall's appointment to be Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court was itself partially due to his being
President Adams' Secretary of State, and thus readily available
when the President was under extreme pressure to make an
appointment before a rapidly approaching deadline for a
Congressionally-mandated reduction in the Court's size.4
Americans tend to forget the unique experiment in
government that was launched first by the Declaration of
Independence in 1776, followed shortly by a proposed Articles of
Confederation left unratified until 1781.
As a European
commentator has observed concerning this period of American
history; this was a time of Constitution making, not a time of
constitutional interpretation. Referring to the shaping of the
European Union, he continued:
We have ...inherited a tradition of constitutional theory from
revolutionary France and America that testifies to the belief that
Constitution-making can be based on intelligent decisions, on
careful argument and sensitive historical understanding.5
Thus, we are reminded that the American venture into
republican and federal forms of government were major events,
not only in our national development, but also in world history.
Despite the Founding Fathers' investigation for antecedents
throughout history as it was then known,6 the combination of

3. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE RULE OF LAW ix-xi (1996).
4. See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN

MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at 9-10 (1997) (citing Kathryn Turner [Preyer], The
Appointment of Chief Justice Marshall, 17 WM. & MARY Q. (3" Ser.) 143, 14363 (1960)).
5. Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Aspects of European Constitutionalism,21 EUR. L.
REv. 32, 39-40 (1996).
6. The Federalist Papers provide a good example of this type of study. See

THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the Lycian league in
Greece); THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison) (discussing "turbulent
democracies in ancient Greece and modern Italy"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 16
(Alexander Hamilton) (discussing Lycian and Achaean leagues); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (discussing
Achaean league); THE FEDERALIST No. 19 (James Madison & Alexander
Hamilton) (discussing Frankish and Holy Roman empires,

and Swiss
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classical republicanism and federalism raised special problems
when approached from the perspectives prevalent in the last
quarter of the eighteenth century. One of the least explored areas
was the constitutional function of the federal judiciary established
in part by the Federal Constitution. The Articles of Confederation
assigned a minor role to national judicial courts, and limited their
jurisdiction to appeals from state admiralty courts in cases of prize
and capture. However, the Supreme Court, as mandated by the
Federal Constitution, was to have both original and appellate
jurisdiction, and would function as the primary American court of
international law. The Constitution also provided for such lower
federal courts as Congress might decide to create, permitting a
much broader scope for judicial activity than otherwise might have
been the case. It was the lower federal courts, primarily those
designated circuit courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789, that would
carry federal authority and judicial power to the grass roots of
early America.7
When John Marshall was confirmed as Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court on January 31, 1801, the Court had
evidenced little of the stature and influence it would achieve
during his tenure on its bench. This was not because it lacked
competent leadership or accomplished legal professionals. Chief
Justices John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth provided the Court with a
well-defined sense of its place in a government where powers were
separated. They and their colleagues strained their physical
strength, and some had died of illness aggravated by the strenuous
duties of riding the circuit. The Jay Court undertook the
unpopular task of making American debtors pay their preRevolutionary obligations to British merchants. It also found
itself repudiated by the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment
after it had asserted jurisdiction over a defendant state. The
Ellsworth Court developed prize law for the new nation during the
confederation); THE FEDERALIST No. 20 (James Madison & Alexander
Hamilton) (discussing Dutch confederation); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES
MADISON

& JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST, OR,

THE [NIEW CONSTITUTION:

[PAPERS 63, 83, 98, 110-14, 116-21, 123-27 (Heritage Press 1945) (1787-88).
7. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 19-57 (1982) (discussing the
Pennsylvania Federal Circuit Court); R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 316-32 (1985)

(discussing Justice Joseph Story's work in the New England circuit courts); 1
JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

552-661 (Paul A. Freund ed.

1971) (discussing the U.S. circuit courts in general); 2 GEORGE L. HASKINS &
HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL 1801-1815,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 630-51 (Paul A.
Freund ed. 1981) (discussing the U.S. circuit courts in general); JOHNSON,

supra note 4, at 112-37 (discussing the U.S. circuit courts and the projection of
federal power).
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Quasi-War with France, and dealt with complex issues of
international and domestic law presented by the French
Revolution and the continuance of British power in North
America. Yet despite these achievements, the Jay-Ellsworth
Court, operating with a limited caseload, had little opportunity to
rough out the framework of federalism in the new American
union.8
Undeniably Chief Justice Marshall brought special skills in
leadership, as well as a gift for the exposition of public law, to his
duties at the Supreme Court. He was an innovator in Supreme
Court procedure. This can be seen in the Marshall Court's pattern
of opinion delivery, and the institution of seniority in opinion
delivery, which enhanced the Chief Justice's authority and the
introduction of ostensible unanimity in Supreme Court opinions.
Prior to Joseph Story joining the Court in 1812, the Chief Justice,
or the senior associate Justice on the bench, delivered virtually all
of the opinions of the Court. Thereafter, seniority seems to have
declined in importance, and almost disappeared after 1819. 9 We
do not know how Court opinions were prepared, but there is
evidence that each Justice might have come to the conference with
a draft, and that the draft may have been circulated in advance of
the meeting.1" While John Marshall did not introduce the practice
of unitary opinions, he was responsible for expanding an earlier
practice into a general procedure, and, under his leadership,
"Opinions of the Court" were firmly established as the standard
format for future generations."
He was also capable of
8. See generally WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH

(1995) (surveying the work of the Jay-Ellsworth Courts); RICHARD B. MORRIS,
JOHN JAY, THE NATION AND THE COURT (1967) (assessing the work of John
Jay); Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, Honour, Justice, and Interest: John Jay's
Republican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in SERIATIM:

THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 26-69 (Scott D. Gerber ed.
1998) (discussing John Jay); William R. Castro, Oliver Ellsworth: "I [H]ave
[Slought the [Flelicity and [Gllory of lYlour Administration," in SERIATIM: THE

SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL, supra, 292-321 (discussing Oliver
Ellsworth).
9.

See JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 100-02; HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra

note 7, at 382-89.
10. See JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 102.
11. Id. at 102-06. Paul Kahn notes that the unitary opinion frees the Court
members from personal responsibility to the text; thus, they can depart from it
with greater ease in subsequent cases, and even the author's personal
reputation does not color the opinion with an individualistic stamp. Seriatim
opinions, on the other hand, invite future contest and disagreement. The
traditional British seriatim approach was particularly well suited to the
elaboration of ancient common law principles. It was inappropriate in
establishing a new system of federal constitutional law. See PAUL W. KAHN,
THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY v. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA 105-15 (1997).
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discouraging dissenting and concurring opinions, based in large
degree upon his personality and charm, but also because of the
Justices' unique living conditions. 2 During most of the Marshall
era, they lodged together in the same Washington boarding
house." As a consequence, they shared meals and recreational
time, which minimized the likelihood of corrosive argument at the
Court's conferences. 14
Modern theories of small group dynamics highlight the
personal qualities of Marshall and may explain some of his success
in achieving unity and mutual support among members of the
Court.
Group cohesion may develop from a variety of
relationships, including sharing tasks and exchanging specialized
knowledge. There is documentary evidence that the Justices
helped each other with advice and assistance in the conduct of
circuit duties. 5 When a small group is opposed by a larger outgroup, or perhaps the whole society, it tends to become more
introspective and there is an increase in internal bonding. During
the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, the Court first operated under
the threat of impeachment, and subsequently it was ostracized
from Washington society. That remained the case until bachelor
Justice Thomas Todd courted and married Dolly Madison's niece,
at which point the Marshall Court seems to have married
vicariously into an expanded social life. Small group leadership
requires the leader to captain the defense against external
enemies, a task that naturally fell to Marshall in his first decade
as Chief Justice. Skilled in political maneuvering and widely
respected by friend and foe alike, Marshall was the ideal protector
of the Court and its elderly Justices. 6
Without doubt, Chief Justice John Marshall brought to his
Court duties a series of gifts -greatness with which he was born
and greatness which he had acquired through his prior experience
as lawyer, legislator, and diplomat. Yet we have suggested that
the implacable opposition of President Thomas Jefferson may have
made his task easier, at least as far as Court cohesion was
concerned. No leadership can be exercised in a vacuum, and
institutional growth is difficult if the surrounding circumstances
inhibit change. A full understanding of the judicial career of John
Marshall may be more readily achieved by a close comparative

12. See JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 96-99. See also G. Edward White, The
Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-52 (1984)
(referring to decision-making and collegiality).
13. See JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 97-99.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 135.
16. Id. at 135-37. Small group dynamics are more fully examined in
Herbert A. Johnson, Chief Justice John Marshall, 1801-1835, 1998 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. SOC'Y 1, 3-20 (1998).
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look at the characteristics of one or more federal systems and the
way in which their growth mirrors that of American federalism
under the guidance of Marshall. More specifically, it is necessary
to consider how central courts within federal systems
simultaneously expand federal authority and enhance their own
power and authority.
At first glance, it might appear obvious that American
federalism should be compared to the federal systems of the
Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia.
However, each of those nations began their federal existence with
two central appellate courts rather than one. One of those courts,
the British Privy Council, entertained quite different views of
federalism from those held by the Canadian Supreme Court and
the High Court of Australia, both before and after Privy Council
review ended in 1986. In addition, both Canada and Australia
adopted the British principle of legislative supremacy, contrary to
American preferences for limited legislative authority restrained
by judicial review. Finally, neither Australia nor Canada, before
the Quebec independence movement, exhibited the local and state
particularism characteristic of the United States. American
uniqueness in this regard is due in part to the irregular extension
of English law to the American colonies, but it also derives from
the divergent development of law and governmental forms in the
various states of the American union."'
American state
particularism makes the evolution of the European Union, and the
work of its European Court of Justice, more easily comparable to
the early American republic and the work of the Marshall Court.
I.

COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Looking at the Marshall Court and the European Court of
Justice, we shall need to examine the visible tip of a much larger
iceberg that drifts in the cold, uncharted and turbulent sea of
federalism, nationalism, and states-rights. Are there special
characteristics shared by central courts in federal unions which
facilitate transfers of power from the constituent states to the
central government?
More specifically, do central courts,
17. See Herbert A. Johnson, Historical and Constitutional Perspectives on
Cross-Vesting of Court Jurisdiction, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 45, 49-51 (1993)

(discussing the contrasts between the extension of English law to North
America and Australia); PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA
§§ 17.3(a) & 17.4(a) (1992) (discussing the role of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in restricting Canadian federal power). In the case of
Australia's Commonwealth Constitution, appeals which involve the question
of power distribution between the Commonwealth and the States (inter se
cases) were not appealable to the Privy Council except by permission of the
High Court of Australia. Only one such certificate has ever been given by the
High Court. See TONY BLACKSHIELD ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND THEORY 832-33 (1996).
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operating at the initial phases of federalizing -or "integration" as
the Europeans would have itenjoy unique advantages in
shaping the constitutional and legal foundations of those emerging
central governments? These are the basic questions that we may
begin to answer by looking at the United States Supreme Court
under John Marshall, and comparing it to the European Court of
Justice as it has evolved into a system of Community
constitutional law between 1957 and 1993.
Comparisons across national, cultural, and chronological
differentials require that there be some relevant similarities
among the institutions being studied. At the same time, no
comparative study can be valid unless due consideration is given
to the differences between the institutions. Fortunately, some
very thorough pioneering work has already been done on
federalism in the European Union, comparing it to the federal
system current in the United States today. Briefly, scholars of the
European Union [hereinafter EU] consider it to be much less
centralized than the United States in the twentieth century.
However, they also look closely at the work of the Marshall Court
to explain the evolution of American federalism at its earliest
stages."8 This work is helpful in many ways, but our focus in this
paper is not upon the European Court of Justice, but rather upon
the Marshall Court, and what the experience of the European
Court tells us about the Marshall era.
Historically, there is good reason to compare the European
Court of Justice's evolution of EU constitutionalism with the
growth of federal power under the guidance of Chief Justice
Marshall and his Supreme Court colleagues. European unification
began in the wake of World War II, which left most of Europe
devastated by war, just as the new American states found
themselves in economic depression and exhaustion after the
Revolution. Like the American states prior to the Revolution,
European nations before the war were dependent upon worldwide
commerce for their economic prosperity. Americans emerged from
an imperial system and found themselves excluded from trading
patterns they had enjoyed in the British Empire. In 1945,
European nations were challenged by the collapse of their empires,
and by the resulting need to establish new commercial
18. Two useful articles are Francis C. Jacobs & Kenneth L. Karst, The
'Federal' Legal Order: The U.S.A. and Europe Compared: A Juridical
Perspective, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, Book 1, 169-242, and Mauro Cappelletti & David
Gulay, The Judicial Branch in the Federal and Transnational Union: Its
Impact on Integration, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, Book 2, 261-350 (Mauro Cappeletti, et al.
eds. 1986). For a brief but careful review of these topics, see generally Sally J.
Kenney, The European Court of Justice: Integrating Europe through Law, 81
JUDICATURE 250 (1998).
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relationships. Each European nation felt vulnerable to the
influence of two competing nuclear powers -the United States
and the Soviet Union. Similarly, the newly independent American
states were threatened by British power in Canada and the
Maritimes, and British military garrisons in what would become
the Northwest Territory. At the same time, until the completion of
the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the southwestern and southern
borders of the United States, including access to the Gulf of
Mexico, were alternatively dominated by Spain or France. 9
Europe after World War II, like the United States in the 1780s,
saw advantages that would accrue from creating an internal
common market for trade. Significantly, it was the small nations
of Europe -Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg- who led
the way with the Benelux establishment and the European Coal
and Steel Community. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution,
it was the small American states whose prosperity was most
closely tied to commerce, who were the strongest advocates for a
federal union and the establishment of a common market that
would enhance internal trade."
A variety of economic and geographical factors ensured that
the elimination of trade barriers would be both feasible and
profitable in post-World War II Europe. Climatic difference
between the nation states encouraged the establishment of
intergovernmental systems for the free exchange of agricultural
products. Varying levels of industrialization promised a
flourishing inter-European trade in manufactured goods.
Coordinating national initiatives in marketing and finance called
for the decline of tariffs and economic subsidies which had
flourished under the aegis of balance of payments mercantilism.
These incentives also existed in the newly independent American
states, although a strong industrial base was not present until
well after 1800.
Both the post-Revolutionary American States and the
Western European nations after World War II had much to gain
by pooling their economic resources into a common market. Given
their traditional competitiveness with each other, the Europeans
entered union gradually, through a series of treaties which
regulated an ever-expanding area of economic activity, and which
more recently moved into the fields of diplomacy, human rights,
and a common currency. Blessed with more homogeneous legal
19. See BRADFORD PERKINS, THE FIRST RAPPROCHEMENT: ENGLAND AND
THE UNITED STATES, 1795-1805, at 1-4, 21-22 (1967). For a contemporary

expression of the threat of regional divisions, see THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John
Jay) and THE FEDERALIST No. 21 (Alexander Hamilton).
20. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 282-301 (1950); FORREST
MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE 358-67, 374-76, 378-81 (1958).
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institutions and helped by a common language, Americans moved
more quickly -but nevertheless with the same caution, first into
the Articles of Confederation in 1781, followed by the Federal
Constitution in 1789.
The European Union rests upon international treaties, which
commentators suggest are "constitutionalized" into the formative
documents upon which the EU institutions operate, and upon
which Community law depends.
These treaties, as well as
Community legislation and Court of Justice decisions, are multilingual, generating uncertainty concerning meaning and
demanding judicial interpretation. While the treaties generally
set forth EU policy in clear terms, they tend to be less complete in
setting out what the implementing law should be, and thus leave
significant matters to the Court of Justice for interpretation.
Some provisions are "open-textured," having much less detail than
a British or United States statute, and, frequently, key words are
not defined in the treaty, EU regulation, or EU directive. Of
necessity, interpretation sometimes verges upon law-making, for
which it is criticized."'
By way of contrast, the United States Constitution is a single
document, written in one official language, and subject to fewer
changes over a much longer historical period. However, its
purposes and policies also are frequently left vague and unstated.
As Chief Justice Marshall reminded us, the Constitution provides
an outline rather than a comprehensive plan for union. He
correctly observed that our Constitution would become
unmanageable and prolix if all the details of its operation were
included within the text." Justice Felix Frankfurter, after nearly
two decades experience on the Supreme Court bench, expressed
frustration at the "vague and admonitory" nature of some
constitutional provisions. He pointed out that the United States
Constitution, like all legal documents, had to be ambulant and
adaptable to the changes of time. Finally, he expressed his
concern and discomfort over the "evolution of social policy by way
of judicial
application
of Delphic
provisions
of the
Constitution....
The Court of Justice enjoys a significant procedural
21. See discussion at STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW:
THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 166182 (1995) (discussing actions against Member States under Articles 169, 170

and 171). A directive is a notice to one or more Member States issued by the
EU. It sets forth a policy which is to be implemented by a method to be chosen
by the Member State. The regulation has general applicability (the technical
term is "directly applicable") and is binding throughout the EU without any
action by the Member States. Id. at 136-38.
22. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
23. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 217, 228, 229, 231 (1955).
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advantage over Marshall's Court in its ability to provide advisory
opinions upon European Community [hereinafter ECI law to
courts in the Member States. Article 177 of the EC Treaty
(Amsterdam, art. 234) permits, and in some cases requires, a
Member State court to "refer" issues of Community law to the
Court of Justice. These preliminary rulings constitute about onehalf of the European Court's caseload, and they have been
responsible for the declaration of several fundamental principles of
Community law. There is a fairly broad spectrum of courts,
tribunals, and quasi-judicial institutions that are competent to
refer questions to the Court of Justice, and the Court tends to
allow considerable leeway in permitting reference of issues that
may not be directly relevant to the decision of the pending case.24
By way of contrast, the authority of the United States Supreme
Court to review state court decisions is very limited. The court
from which the appeal is taken must be the highest state court
capable of deciding the case; that was as true in Marshall's day as
it is today. In Marshall's day, the federal question involved in the
appeal had to have been decided against the constitutionality of
the federal statute or treaty provision. Not surprisingly, from
1801 through 1815 only 17 appeals from state courts were heard
by the Marshall Court; during the same time period, 361 cases
were appealed from the federal circuit courts. 5 Clearly, the
European Court of Justice has at its disposal a much more
efficient "mouse trap" for conforming Member State law to
Community standards through Article 177 (Amsterdam, art. 234)
than the Marshall Court possessed under section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.
We should note the existence of a procedure in the Marshall
Court for referring issues raised in the lower federal courts for
decision by the Supreme Court. Originally called a certificate of
division, the procedure continues -albeit rarely used- at the
present day. When the judges sitting in the United States Circuit
24. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 279-94. Brown and
Kennedy point out that when the Member State court is one from which no
appeal lies within the national system, it is mandatory that an Art. 177
(Amsterdam, art. 234) reference be made, but in all other cases, the request
for a reference is discretionary with the Member State court or tribunal. See L.
NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 196 (1994).

25. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 623-25, 653. However,
appeals from state courts tended to be politically controversial. They include:
Fairfax v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6

Wheat.) 264 (1821); and Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
Throughout this paper the term "appeal" is used to cover cases reviewed by

the use of one of three procedures: the writ of error (common law), appeal
(admiralty and equity matters), and the certificate of division (where the
judges divided evenly in the U. S. circuit courts).
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Courts disagreed, the issue might be certified to the full bench of
the Supreme Court for decision. Since the judges present were
usually two in number -the Supreme Court justice riding circuit
and the United States District Judge- they might, by agreeing to
disagree, bring before the Supreme Court an issue that the parties
might be reluctant to raise on appeal. 6 Since the procedure was
discretionary, it did not have the broad coverage of Article 177
(Amsterdam, art. 234), and of course, it only applied within the
federal court system.
It would be simplistic to assume that the growth of federal
power, either in the United States or in the European Union, has
been unidirectional. With the implementation of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1993, there has been concerted effort to halt, or to
decelerate, the further integration of the Community and to
minimize inroads on the power and sovereignty of the Member
States. Since 1993, the European Court of Justice's doctrines of
subsidiarity and proportionality have begun to move power back to
the States, and a stricter construction of Article 235 (Amsterdam,
art. 308) has limited the discretion hitherto exercised by
Community institutions. 7 Under the earlier version of Article 235,
a unanimous vote by the EC Council might authorize any measure
necessary to advance the objectives of the Community. However,
after Maastricht, the Court of Justice has insisted that actions
taken under Article 235 be justified by being reconciled to the
principle of subsidiarity -that actions are more appropriately left
to the component Member States except in cases where the States
are unable to deal with the issue at a national or local level.28
Americans familiar with the contrasting jurisprudence of the
Marshall and Taney Courts may well find similarities in the post-

26. See JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 116, 120. Mr. John Lupton, an editor of
the Legal Papers of Abraham Lincoln, is in the process of examining the
certificate of division/certified question procedure from its inception in 1802 to
its modification in 1892.
27. See Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION
OF EU LAW 321-47 (P.P. Craig & G. De Bdrca eds. 1999). The principle of
subsidiarity requires that matters subject to adequate treatment at the
Member State level should not be undertaken by the EU; proportionality
requires that Community action be minimized and that interference with
Member State activities be in proportion to the importance of the Community
objective to be achieved by the interference. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT,
supra note 21, at 468-69.

28. Id. at 141-43. Like the Marshall Court, the Court of Justice has been
criticized for what today is termed "judicial activism," and a series of articles
have alternatively attacked the Court or defended its activities in these terms.
See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J.
2403, 2403-83 (1991); T.C. Hartley, The European Court, Judicial Objectivity

and the Constitution of the European Community, 112 L. Q. REV. 95, 95-109
(1996); and Anthony M. Arnull, The European Court and Judicial Objectivity:
A Reply to ProfessorHartley, 112 L. Q. REV. 411, 411-23 (1996).
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1993 redirection of constitutional decisions by the European Court
of Justice.29
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND DECISION-MAKING
One of the most striking similarities between the Marshall
Court and the European Court of Justice occurs in the processes of
judicial interpretation.
This is remarkable considering the
differences that exist between judicial interpretation in European
civil law and the modes of construction prevalent in the United
States and England. In most Western European systems, the
existence of comprehensive codes results in judicial reasoning
being anchored in precisely drawn code sections, leaving little
flexibility for the judge to engage in wide-ranging construction of
statutory terms.
Simply put, judicial decision-making is
essentially finding the facts of the case and applying pertinent
code sections to resolve the issues between the parties. 0 However,
as Professor John Merryman points out, in the public law area,
European nations over time have tended to move in the direction
of adopting fairly rigid constitutions which are closer to the
American Federal Constitution. With that development has come
increased willingness to employ judicial review.3
By way of
contrast, Anglo-American common law judges operate within a
much broader context.
The legal rules in a common law
jurisdiction are contained not only in statutes, but also in
precedents established by prior case law. With the burgeoning
enactment of statutory law and regulations in modern America,
court decisions frequently
depend upon legislative or
administrative rules; however, these are still construed in light of
pre-existing common law rules and may be measured against the
"higher law" of state and federal constitutions. 2 The predominant
29. On the other hand, R. Kent Newmyer has warned us that the contrast
between Marshall and Taney should not be carried too far. See R. KENT
NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 89-118, 147-

52 (1968). Professor J.H.H. Weiler suggests that there are really three periods
in the history of the Court: (1) a period of supra-nationalism from a lawyer's

point of view, running from 1958 to about 1975, (2) a time of efforts to expand
EC authority, from about 1975 to about 1989, coupled with heavy reliance
upon art. 235 to expand Community power, and (3) the years after 1990 when

the political agencies of the EU have created constitutional limits upon
Community power. See Weiler, supra note 28, at 2410, 2416-17, 2434.
30. A useful general discussion of civil law codification and judicial
decision-making is in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA 27-31, 40-49 (1969).

31. Id. at 142-45.
32. RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 164-66, 201 (2nd ed.

1968). The American preference for common law precedent to legislative
statute may well be traced to the views of Sir Edward Coke and Sir Matthew
Hale, discussed in JOHN G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE
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role of precedent was even more dispositive in John Marshall's
day, and was legitimated by the early Republic's acceptance of the
seventeenth-century English Whig perspective that the liberties of
Englishmen depended upon the ancient common law, and not the
sovereignty of Parliament.
With the European Court's membership roughly proportional
to the membership of the EU,' most judges bring a civil law
training to their work on the Court. However, the Court has shown
a tendency to use a broad system of judicial interpretation in
conducting its decision-making. Recently, most Court of Justice
opinions evidence one of two methods of interpretation. One is a
contextual approach, which looks to all EU treaties, and all
Community legislation, to determine what policies or rules apply
to the area of concern and whether they are consistent with each
other. The other interpretive method has been what Professor
Brown terms teleological -a consideration of the overall purpose
and intent of EC treaties and other policy documents as an aid to
construing the terms before it. This has also been denominated a
"purposive" approach to interpretation. The difference between
these two approaches is that the first is tied to textual materials,
while the latter permits a non-textual identification of Community
policy that will govern interpretation.35
At first glance, Marshall Court decision-making appears to be
based upon textual analysis -a careful examination of words and
phrases in constitutional or statutory language. However, the
European Court parallel causes us to redirect our attention to the
interpretive methods employed by the Chief Justice and his
colleagues. Are Marshall Court decisions contextual? Perhaps the
most familiar example is Marshall's construing the "necessary and
proper" clause in light of the provision in Article I, Section 10,
which stipulates that states might not lay "imposts, or duties on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws ...... His conclusion was that the
Constitution's draftsmen intentionally distinguished between
these two phrases, and might have similarly limited the
"necessary and proper" clause had they seen fit to do so."
FEUDAL LAW 170-73 (1987).
33. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 265-67, 294-95 (1969); ROBERT K. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF JOHN MARSHALL 59-61 (1968). Dr. Hobson points out that Marshall made

an effort to conform his statutory constructions to the dictates of equity and
natural justice. HOBSON, supra note 3, at 162-63.
34. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 43-47.
35. Id. at 299-322. The "purposive" nomenclature is used by WEATHERILL
& BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 172-74.
36. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) (emphasis
added).

37. Id. at 414-15.
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As Professor Currie points out, Justice Story rejected a
similar contextual argument in The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson,38
a purported admiralty case based upon a seaman's wage claim for
work on a ship navigating the Missouri River. Citing the English
rule that maritime contracts were cognizable in admiralty only if
duties had been performed on the high seas, Story proceeded to
reject counsel's argument that the Judiciary Act of 1789, creating
admiralty jurisdiction, was adequate to bring the case within the
class of "cases arising under federal law." 9 According to Story,
nothing less than an express statutory provision evidencing
congressional intention to include such contracts would suffice to
confer federal court jurisdiction." The statute in question was not
sufficiently broad, and was too ambiguous concerning Congress'
intent, to encompass this claim to an expanded admiralty
jurisdiction. 4
The European Court of Justice is no stranger to contextual
interpretation, and indeed may be said to have outdone the
Marshall Court in this aspect of construction.
Brown and
Kennedy point out that in the Gingerbread2 case, the Court was
called upon to construe Article 12 (Amsterdam, art. 25 ) which
prohibits Member States from imposing "new customs duties on
imports [or exports,] ...
or [any] charges having similar
effect .... " The Court considered the prominent position of this
provision at the beginning of the treaty, citing this to be evidence
of its importance and "essential nature" to the formation of the
Community. It then noted that the principle of "free circulation of
goods," was treated as a fundamental aspect of the Community in
Article 9 (Amsterdam, art. 23). Finally, it stressed the significance
of Articles 9 and 12 (Amsterdam, art. 25) in condemning unilateral
changes in customs and fiscal practices which inhibited the free
trade in goods, and thus violated Community norms.
The
judgment concluded that "charges having similar effect" had to be
construed broadly to include all barriers, pecuniary or otherwise,
to trade between Member States. Brown and Kennedy suggest
that an English court, faced with the same general words, would
have construed them narrowly to conform
most closely to the
44
specific term "duties" which preceded it.
38. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
39. Id. at 429-30.
40. Id. at 430.
41. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 116 (1985); The Steamboat Thomas

Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429-30 (1825).
42. Consolidated Cases 2/62 & 3/61, Re Import Duties on Gingerbread: The
Commission of E.E.C. v. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of
Belgium, [1963] C.M.L.R. 199 (1962).
43. Id. at 215.
44. BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 311-13; Gingerbread, [1963]
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More recently, the European Court has applied contextual
reasoning to both affirm, and to limit, the power of Member States
to enter into international treaties unilaterally. Negotiations
leading to the European Road Transportation Agreement
[hereinafter ERTA] had been on-going for several years under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
and the six Member States of the Community had been involved
directly in those discussions. Although the proposed treaty was
concluded in 1962, ratifications had not been exchanged, and the
Council of the European Community authorized further
coordinated negotiations by the six Member States, based upon
Council Regulation 543/69 (adopted on March 27, 1969). The
European Commission objected to the Council's permitting the
Member States to conclude negotiations, asserting that under the
Treaty of Rome (ratified in 1957), the Community's Commission
had exclusive authority to negotiate.45 The litigants agreed, and
under the Council's direction, negotiation of ERTA was conducted
by the six individual Member States, led by the delegation
representing the presidency of the Council of the European
Community.
The Court of Justice declined to follow the recommendation of
the Advocate General, which urged a narrow construction of the
Treaty of Rome that would have permitted the Council to conclude
the then well-advanced negotiations of ERTA under its own
authority. Viewing the question as being whether at the time of
the Council's discussion, on March 20, 1970, the authority to
negotiate on road transportation belonged to the Community, the
Court looked to several articles in the Treaty of Rome which
allocated authority between the Member States and the
Community institutions. Noting that Article 75 (Amsterdam, art.
71) conferred wide authority on the Community to implement a
common transportation policy, the Court held that the
Community's authority clearly encompassed the power to
Once the
negotiate treaties with non-Member States.46
Community had established common rules, as it had in 1969
under Regulation 543/69, Member States might not unilaterally
contract obligations with non-Member States which affected those
common rules. Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome (Amsterdam, art.
10) bound Member States to ensure that the obligations imposed
by the EEC treaty were carried out, and to refrain from taking any
steps that would jeopardize the attainment of treaty objectives.
By enacting Council Regulation 543/69, the EC Council conferred
C.M.L.R. at 215-17, 218-19.
45. Case 22/70, Re The European Road Transport Agreement: E.C.
Commission v. E.C. Council, [1971] C.M.L.R. 335, 336-39 (1971) (Advocate
General submissions).
46. Id. at 344-48, 354-55.
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authority on Community institutions to negotiate internationally
with non-Member States concerning road transportation, and that
authority was thereafter exclusively within the scope of
Community external authority.4 7 As the Court observed:
[to determine in a particular case the Community's authority to
enter into international agreements, one must have regard to the
whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its specific provisions....
Such authority may arise not only from an explicit grant by the
treaty.. .but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty,
and from steps taken, within the framework of these provisions, by
the Community institutions.48
However, although the Court upheld the Commission's
contentions in principle, it pointed out that even after the
transition period stipulated by Article 116 of the Treaty of Rome
(replaced by Amsterdam, art. 135), pending negotiations might be
concluded by the common action of the Member States, in
accordance with directions received from the Council. Introducing
the Community as a new party as late in the proceedings as 1970
might well have jeopardized the successful conclusion of ERTA
treaty negotiations. Thus, the Court concluded that in negotiating
ERTA, the Member States acted "in the interest of and on account
of the Community," and in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty
of Rome (Amsterdam, art. 10). 49 On the other hand, the reasoning
on the merits provided a strong legal basis for the Community's
authority thereafter to exercise exclusive authority in
international diplomacy which involved Community matters.
Subsequent cases have demonstrated similar flexibility in
allocating treaty-making powers between Member States and
Community institutions. However, the clear tendency is to restrict
the international authority of Member States to negotiate with
non-member nations. 50
A. Open-Ended Opportunitiesfor JudicialInterpretation
Both the European Court of Justice and the Marshall Court
demonstrate skill in deferring judgment on issues that might
provide future opportunities for court interpretation and doctrinal
evolution. In the case of the Marshall Court, the best-known

47. Id. at 348-40, 355-56.
48. Id. at 354-55.
49. Id. at 359-62.
50. For example, the European Court of Justice held that the European
Economic Area agreement concluded between Member and non-Member
States clashed with the supremacy of the EC Treaty, and also found
unacceptable the provisions which created a separate European Economic

Area Court which might render decisions contrary to those of the European
Court of Justice. See the discussion at WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note
21, at 320-22.
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example is Marshall's decision that the Commerce Clause was not
exclusive, but rather concurrent with state judicial power -in
certain limited cases. What those cases might be, and how they
would be treated when presented for decision, was something left
to future litigation before the Court. Felix Frankfurter synopsized
Marshall's approach and thought-patterns quite well:
The need of a strong central government ...was for him the deepest
article of his political faith, But while he had rooted principles, he
was pragmatic in their application. No less characteristic than the
realization of the opportunities presented by the commerce
clause.. .was his empiricism in not tying the Court to rigid formulas
for accomplishing such restrictions. 5'
As Frankfurter demonstrates, the Chief Justice drew back
from at least two doctrinal interpretations that might stultify
future development.
One was the temptation of using the
Supremacy Clause, and declaring that the New York statutes in
Gibbons v. Ogden" were repugnant to the power vested in
Congress by the Constitution and exercised by the Federal
Coasting Licensing Act. The second was the opportunity to assert
exclusive federal control even in the absence of any Congressional
legislation -what we have come to call the "dormant commerce
power." Instead, Marshall left the interstate commerce clause in a
state of ambiguity, preserving a void to be filled by subsequent
opinions of his Supreme Court. Leaving options open for future
decision by the Court made the area of interstate commerce one of
the richest sources of federal power in antebellum America. It also
enhanced the central position of the Supreme Court as an
expositor of constitutional law. 3
At least two other Marshall Court ambiguities left room for
future judicial interpretation. In Fletcherv. Peck, 4 Marshall based
his decision not only upon the Contract Clause, but also upon
"general principles which are common to our free institutions, or
by particular provisions of the constitution of the United
States ..... " The inference that protection of property rights
might be involved in a general common law of all the American
states, or perhaps even a principle of natural law, left ample room
for the future exploration of concepts earlier touched upon by

51.

FELIX FRANKFURTER,

THE

COMMERCE

CLAUSE

UNDER MARSHALL,

TANEY AND WAITE 14-15 (Quadrangle Books 1964) (1936).
52. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 448 (1821).

53. Id. at 15-34.

Professor Currie suggests that Marshall's concept of

"exclusivity" ostensibly upheld in Gibbons v. Ogden, did not necessarily
preclude state actions touching upon interstate commercial activity.
supra note 41, at 175.
54. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

55. Id. at 138.

CURRIE,
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Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull,5" and which Marshall
reconsidered in his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders. 7 At the same
time, Marshall's statement left open, until 1833, the possibility
that some Federal Bill of Rights provisions might provide
protection against state action trespassing upon property rights.58
Chief Justice Marshall had the support of his associate
Justices in preserving latitude for future Supreme Court decisionmaking. Professor Currie points out that Justice Joseph Story
utilized what I have termed an "open-ended" approach to the
question of jury trials in civil cases under the Seventh
Amendment. Parsons v. Bedford involved a clash between
procedural requirements under Louisiana state law, and the rules
applicable to trials by jury in federal courts. Under the terms of
an 1824 United States statute, the federal district courts sitting in
Louisiana were directed to follow the practice of the state courts.
Louisiana procedure permitted appellate review of jury verdicts
and the grant of new trials by the state Supreme Court. Yet this
procedure appeared to contradict the express provision of the
Seventh Amendment, which guaranteed that jury verdicts might
not be reversed upon appeal. Furthermore, the terms of Article III
of the Constitution appeared to exclude U.S. Supreme Court
appellate review of facts in common law cases.
In his opinion for the Supreme Court, Story pointed out that
the 1824 federal statute did not impose an absolute requirement
that state procedures be followed. Rather, it allowed the district
judge to make by rule such exceptions as might be required to
conform federal practice to state procedural standards. However,
Louisiana practice allowed the reduction of testimony to writing
prior to submission of the case to the jury, and it was a mistake on
the part of the district judge to deny a request that such a
transcript be prepared. Was it reversible error in the Supreme
Court of the United States, when, the case was before the Supreme
Court on a writ of error? Story established that the only purpose
to be served by allowing the transcription of evidence in this case
would have been to permit the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the
verdict of the jury and to award a new trial. On a writ of error
from any other state than Louisiana, that would have been beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court." Was that also the case in regard to
56. See CURRIE, supra note 41, at 131; HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 7,
at 406, 579-80, 594-97. Compare Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133-35, with
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 386, 388 (1798).
57. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 342-47, 351-54 (1827).

58. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243 (1833) held that Bill of

Rights guarantees were not applicable to the states.
59. Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 433, 44149 (1830).
60. See CURRIE, supra note 41, at 111-12; Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) at

445-46.
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Louisiana cases coming up under a writ of error? The case turned
upon that procedural question, which Story decided against
protests of the defendant, thereby sustaining the general rule that
the facts of a jury verdict were not reviewable on a writ of error.
In arriving at his decision, Story felt called upon to define the
term "common law" as used in the Seventh Amendment, which
was ratified before Louisiana's annexation to the United States.
Avoiding a narrow definition of the term, he pointed out that cases
in equity and admiralty were traditionally exempt from jury trial,
but other cases utilized jury trial. How did the Framers
understand the matters to which jury trials were to extend? They
meant:
[niot merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old
and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where
equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies
administered; or where, as in admiralty, a mixture of public law,
and 6of
1 maritime law and equity was [sic] often found in the same
suit.
He noted that new remedies and new forms of action were not
uncommon throughout the various American states, and to the
extent that these were neither equitable nor maritime in nature,
they also should fall within the protective provisions of the
Constitution and Seventh Amendment.
In adopting such a

sweeping approach, Story nevertheless left open to the decision of
future Supreme Courts the classification of those new remedies
and procedures, and thus whether jury trial would attach by
virtue of the Federal Constitution's mandate."2
Similarly, the European Court of Justice has shown skill in
using the "open ended" technique to provide flexibility for the

evolution of new doctrine. One example is the manner in which
the Court dealt with an employee's claim that the Italian
government's failure to establish a wage guarantee fund damaged
him when his employer filed for bankruptcy." Council Directive
80/987 required Member States to establish guarantee funds from
which employee wage claims might be paid in situations of

employer bankruptcy. The directive permitted Member States to
establish the period during which employee reimbursement might
61. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447.

62. It may also have been true, as Justice John McLean's dissent infers,
that Story's broadening the basis for "common law" jury trial protection may
have been a way to limit the authority of Congress to circumvent the
constitutional requirements of Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Such
a step was possible through the authority of Congress to establish and make
procedural rules for the lower federal courts. Id. at 456.
63. Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Republic of Italy, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R.
66, 66-116 (1991).
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be implemented, and it also allowed discretion in the Member
States to place a ceiling on fund liabilities. Under existing
Community law, the petitioning employee was precluded from
"direct effect" relief since the scope of his entitlement was
conditioned on Member State action, namely establishing a
liability ceiling and a time-table for employer implementation,
which in turn determined the period for which compensation was
payable.
As Advocate General Jean Mischo phrased the issue, it was
"whether, generally speaking, a national court may be required by
virtue of Community law to hold the State liable where failure to
implement a directive which does not give rise to direct effect has
caused harm to an individual." 4 He argued that damages could be
awarded to a citizen who had been injured by State defiance of
directly effective Community law. Since this was a case based
upon the "Community legal order," no distinction should be made
when the formal requirements of direct effect were not present.
The courts of the Member States should uphold Community law
rights, and provide effective remedies to those individuals who
were damaged by State neglect of Community obligations. 5
The Court of Justice agreed, imposing liability upon the
Italian government for the losses suffered by Francovich, despite
the fact that it was the non-feasance, rather than the misfeasance
of the government that caused the damage. In such cases, there
would be no basis to claim a "direct effect." Nevertheless, the
Member State was held liable to pay compensation for damages
which resulted from its failure to implement the Community
directive. The full effectiveness of Community law would be
impaired if individuals were denied reparation in this sort of
case.66 Thus, the Court of Justice expanded the right of private
individuals to bring action against a Member State court when
Community rights were impaired by failure to implement a
Community directive. It laid down three requirements governing
the availability of such relief: (1) The directive must be such that it
entailed a grant of rights to individuals, (2) The directive should
adequately identify the content of those rights and (3) There must
be a causal link between the harm suffered by the individual and
the Member State's breach of its Community obligation. In effect,
Francovich established a broad possibility of expanded individual
litigation against Member States, subject to three conditions to be
construed and further refined by the judgments of the Court of
Justice.
The Court of Justice did not long delay the opportunity to add

64. Id. at 84.
65. Id. at 86.
66. Id. at 111-16.
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glosses to the Francovich decision. In Dillenkofer v. Germany,67 it
held that failure to implement an EU directive within the
stipulated time would subject a Member State to liability when
one of its citizens suffered a financial loss after purchasing a
package tour. The directive required that some form of insurance
or governmental guarantee protect purchasers of package tours
from insolvency of the tour organizer.
Although the Court
conceded that German legislative procedures made it impossible to
provide consumer protection within the period stipulated by the
directive, it nevertheless held Germany liable even though no fault
was involved. Francovich required that the Member State's
breach of Community law be sufficiently serious before direct
liability to a citizen could arise. The Court held that a failure to
implement a directive was per se sufficiently serious to give rise to
liability under the Francovichdoctrine. In addition, it rejected the
argument that until Germany acted, the extent of Member State
liability was uncertain, hence the citizen's claim was too unclear
for recovery to be granted. To the contrary, the Court reasoned
that, regardless of the Member State's action or inaction, the
citizen had the right to expect that on the effective date of the
directive, there would be recovery of monies lost through
insolvency, and that the cost of return transportation would be
provided. This was sufficiently certain to comply with the
Francovich requirement. Finally, the Court noted that no Member
State might rely upon its own internal laws or procedures to
justify delay in transposing a directive into national law. The only
relief available to a State unable to comply within the prescribed
period, was for the State to apply to the Community authorities for
an authorization to delay implementation.6 8
Along with Dillenkofer, the Court replied to two referred cases
concerning the extent and criteria for damages that might be
available to individuals affected by a Member State's action
contrary to Community law. In FactortameIII,69 the complainant
Spanish fishermen were excluded from British waters by a
Parliamentary statute, and among other claims for relief, they
sought compensation for their lost profits.
In Brasserie du
PercheurSA, 70 a French brewery was precluded from exporting to
Germany by administrative enforcement of a German statute
regulating the purity of beer. In his lengthy submissions to the
Court, Advocate General Giuseppe Tesauro pointed out that

67. Joined Cases C-178, 179, 188, 189 & 190/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 469 (1996).

68. Id. at para. 19-26, 29, 42, 46, 53-54.
69. Joined Cases C 46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Percheur SA v. Germany;

Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame, Ltd., [19961 1
C.M.L.R. 889 (1996).
70. Id.
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Francovich was a confirmation of a long-standing value -that
there must be effective implementation of Community provisions.
Affording complete judicial protection to those injured by breaches
of Community law was a fundamental characteristic inherent in
the Community legal order. The Community must be the origin of
the liability rules applicable to Member States.71 In its judgment,
the Court further explained the Francovich tri-partite test, noting
that the second branch -involving the serious nature of the
breach- would occur when a Member State "manifestly and
gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion." As to the causal
link between the Member State's breach and the claimant's injury,
it was for national courts to decide that issue. Reparations were to
be awarded in accordance with national standards, but in no case
were they to be less than what would have been awarded in a
purely domestic case. Those damages might include reparations
for loss of profits attributable to the Member State's action.72
Finally, the Member States' liability could not be conditioned upon
there having been a prior adjudication concerning the legality of
the questioned action.72
Frequently,
European Community legislation may itself
provide an opportunity for Court of Justice findings that are "openended" in format. The Sex Discrimination Directive, Council
Directive 76/207, was brought before the Court by means of an
Article 177 (Amsterdam, art. 234) reference from a West German
court. Three women had been denied positions despite the fact
that they were better qualified than the male applicants who
received the appointments. However, the German Civil Code
provisions purportedly implementing the directive, provided that
employers who violated the Community directive, would be liable
for sums expended by the candidate who relied upon there not
being discriminatory behavior in making the appointment. In the
case of the one applicant who could prove damages through such
reliance, the total damages amounted to 7.20 Deutsche Marks, or
roughly $3.60 (U.S.). In its judgment, the Court of Justice pointed
out that Member States were free to exercise discretion in
selecting means to enforce the Community Directive. On the other
hand, that discretion was to be exercised within limits. There was
no requirement that the disappointed employee be offered
employment, and the award of damages might be an appropriate
sanction. Pointing out that the nominal damages provided by
German law were not an effective sanction to insure compliance,
the Court required that the Member State provide real and
effective judicial protection against sex discrimination.74 Since the
71. Id. at para. 32, 41, 52, 71 (1996) (Advocate General submissions).
72. Id. at para. 51, 65, 83, 86.
73. Id. at para. 95.

74. Case 79/83, Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
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German statute failed to provide adequate sanctions to render the
Community Directive effective, the referring German court was
advised to utilize whatever remedies that might be both (1)
available under German law, and (2) appropriate means of
implementing the Community Directive. 5
Presumably the German court giving judgment in Von Colson
and Kamann would be required to fashion a remedy independent
from the provisions of the Civil Code section implementing the Sex
Discrimination Directive. While those remedies would be limited
by the jurisdiction of the court involved, they would have to be
designed to effectively achieve the purposes of the Directive.
Should they not be appropriate, they would be subject to
mandatory reference from the highest court having cognizance of
the case in Germany, and thus come within additional review by
the European Court of Justice under Article 177 (Amsterdam art.
234). In addition, a recalcitrant Member State may be subject to
direct actions filed against it in the Court of Justice by the
European Commission. Pursuant to the 1991 Maastricht Treaty,
such actions may result in monetary damages being assessed
against a Member State."6
Given the European Community's reliance upon Member
State courts to provide judicial enforcement of Community Law, it
follows that many decisions are, like Von Colson and Kamann,
either advisory or open-ended. As such, they reserve some degree
of discretion to the Member State courts involved, but at the same
time, because of the supremacy of Community law over national
law, Member State courts are under compulsion to respond
positively to the need for effective implementation of Community
law by their judgments.
B. Teleological or "Purposive"Interpretation
The Court of Justice has come under sharp criticism for its
use of a teleological or "purposive" interpretation of Community
law. These terms refer to a method of construction whereby the
Court takes its guidance from the underlying intention of the
constitutive treaties of the EU, seeking to apply its decisionmaking process in accordance with the implied foundational
principles of the Community. In effect, the Court attempts to fill
in some area of Community law that is left unstated in the
treaties, but is raised either as a reference from a Member State
court, or arising directly before the European Court of Justice in
the course of litigation between Member States, between Member

[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 450-52 (1984).
75. Id. at 453-54.
76. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 105-13; WEATHERILL &
BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 192-207.
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States and Community institutions, or even among two or more
"purposive"
or
Teleological
institutions.
Community
interpretation is, therefore, not unlike what modern American
constitutional theorists call "non-interpretive" construction of the
United States Constitution.
The first and least objectionable teleological interpretation is
when the Court of Justice is required to apply an express provision
in the treaty texts which gives wide discretion to the Court. This
occurred in regard to the provisions concerning export and import
duties, which also includes "charges which have an equivalent
effect." Clearly, enforcement of the express provisions requires the
Court to determine what charges do have "equivalent effect.""
The Marshall Court, in Ex ParteBollman and Swartwout8 and the
9
elaborated
Chief Justice subsequently on circuit in U.S. v. Burr,"
upon the Constitution's incomplete definition of the substantive
law of treason, rejecting the English concept of constructive
treason, and setting forth detailed requirements for proof of
treasonable conduct.80 Another Marshall Court example is the
clarification offered in McCulloch v.Maryland8 concerning what
should be considered "necessary" -that is, how essential the
selected means might be to the effective implementation of an
enumerated power of Congress. Both the Marshall Court and the
Court of Justice were simply providing clarification concerning
terms included in the constitutional documents, and responding to
the need that such an interpretation be made before the case
before them could be decided. This is little more than going
through the logical steps necessary to administer justice in a
specific case, and as such, it is the least objectionable aspect of a
court "making law."
Teleological interpretation also arises for the Court of Justice
when the treaty is silent on an important point of law controlling
the case. One such pregnant silence regards the supremacy of
Community law over the legislation and all other Member State
actions that impact upon the Community or its legal system.
While the EC treaty permitted unilateral Member State action in
carefully defined areas, it never specifically provided that
Community law was to take precedence, or be "supreme," over
Member State law in all other matters. On the other hand, the

77. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 174-75; BROWN &
KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 316-21. As Brown and Kennedy point out, this
"filling in of gaps" is a familiar process in civil law legal systems, and is

expressly authorized by the Swiss Civil Code of 1922. Id. at 318.
78. Ex Parte Bollman & Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
79. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
80. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 258-62, 279-85; Ex Parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 125-37; Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33-34.
81. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-21 (1819).
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treaty text did provide that Member States, by negotiating and
ratifying the treaty, were limiting their sovereign rights by
creating the EC and conferring law-making authority upon
Community institutions. In the Costa8" case, the Court of Justice
established the principle that Community law is supreme, and
that the Community itself would lose its purpose if Member States
could annul EC measures by unilateral establishment of contrary
national law. 8
Costa is quite similar in its teleological foundation to the
Marshall Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison," establishing
judicial review. Although Article VI of the Federal Constitution
stipulates that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the land, it fails to provide an
enforcement mechanism, nor does it expressly state that the
Constitution is superior in authority to a statute or treaty.
Considering the actions of an executive department head, Chief
Justice Marshall was requested to issue a mandamus writ that
had been authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789, but appeared to
be available under the Constitution only when the Supreme Court
was exercising its appellate jurisdiction. Declining to issue the
writ, Marshall clearly established the primacy of the Constitution
over federal statutes, and also asserted the authority of the
Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality and validity of
federal statutes. In Costa and in Marbury, there is language
within the constitutional documents that supports the court's
decision. However, it merely forms a basis from which a court
might draw a reasonable inference concerning supremacy, and the
role of the court in effectuating the concept of supremacy.
Another variant of teleological interpretation arises when
there are some relevant provisions in the treaty, and judicial
elaboration occurs in regard to logical implications from the treaty
text.85 McCulloch v. Maryland provides two apt parallels to this
use of teleological interpretation by the European Court of
Justice.86 Discussing the power of the United States government to
establish a banking corporation, Chief Justice Marshall first
pointed out that banks traditionally were used by the British
government as an effective means of fiscal management and
operations. As a mode of implementing enumerated powers, the
creation of a banking corporation was certainly not required to be
included within the enumerated powers, since the Constitution did

82. Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Electrica (ENEL),
[1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
83. Id. at 455-56. See also WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 39-

40 (discussing the role of the President of the Commission).
84. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137-80 (1803).
85. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 175.
86. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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not attempt to enumerate methods by which the federal powers
were to be exercised. On the other hand, were Congress compelled
to rely upon state-chartered banks to achieve its goals, this would
render precarious the activities of the central government,
subjecting them to the caprice of state institutions or state
legislatures.87 In addition, McCulloch points out that concurrent
state powers of taxation cannot be exercised in ways that would
"defeat the legitimate operations of a supreme government."88
Marshall observed, "It is of the very essence of supremacy to
remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to
modify every power vested in subordinate governments as to
exempt its own operations from their own influence."89 While
supremacy is expressly stated in Article VI of the Federal
Constitution, the ramifications of federal supremacy for state
taxation powers were not mentioned within the document itself,
and thus a purposive explanation and justification was required.
A second category of teleological interpretation occurs when
EC law, as yet not subjected to review by the European Court of
Justice, clashes with a positive rule of law within the Member
State. In the Factortame9 case, this situation presented a difficult
issue for the European Court of Justice. The litigation involved a
new British statutory instrument and related administrative
regulations which provided for the registry of fishing vessels, but
which allegedly discriminated against ownership by nationals of
other Member States. Since Community law was involved, the
trial court referred questions to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling under Article 177 (Amsterdam, art. 234).
However, since the Article 177 reference suspended the action on
the merits, the trial court also ordered the Government not to
apply the new requirements to the defendant fishing firm. The
Court of Appeal, followed by confirmation from the House of Lords,
reversed the trial court, and held that since the new requirement
was an act of the UK Parliament, it could not be suspended by a
British court. Furthermore, no British court might grant an
injunction against the Crown -that is, against the Government
acting under Crown prerogatives.91
Pointing out that the rule of Community law was directly
applicable (that is, no Member State action was required to place
87. Id. at 421-24.
88. Id. at 427.
89. Id. at 426-36.
90. Case C-213/89, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte
Factortame Ltd., [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 867 (1990).
91. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 151-52 (discussing
Factortame case); see also BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 195, 224-25,
379-80 (discussing Factortame case); Regina, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 871-73
(providing procedural details in the opinion of Advocate General Giuseppe
Tesauro).
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it in force), the European Court of Justice held that British courts
were required to provide effective protection to those asserting
claims under EC law. Citing the Simmenthal92 case, the Court
ruled invalid:
any provision of a national legal system, .. which might impair the
effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national
court having jurisdiction to apply such law and power to do
everything necessary... to set aside national legislative provisions
which might prevent Community rules from having full force and
effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very
93
essence of Community law.
The existence of a putative Community law right was
sufficient to suspend the operation of a United Kingdom statutory
instrument, and it also empowered a British court to enjoin the
Government from proceeding until the European Court of Justice
had resolved the referenced issues.
Facing similar circumstances, the Marshall Court evolved a
doctrine of concurrent federal and state powers, permitting
flexibility in the Supreme Court's future decisions concerning
federal-state allocations of power. In Houston v. Moore,94 the state
of Pennsylvania established court-martials for the trial of state
The Federal
militiamen who failed to appear for duty.
Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to organize, arm
and discipline the militia. However, it reserved appointment of
officers to the states, and also gave the states the authority to
train the militia in accordance with the discipline prescribed by
Congress. While Congress had passed a 1795 statute providing
procedures for calling militia into federal service, the question of
administering discipline when the militia was not in actual federal
service was not addressed. Justice Bushrod Washington, in what
was designated an "Opinion of the Court", held that federal service
of a militiaman did not begin until his unit arrived at the place of
rendezvous. While Justice Washington conceded that Congress
might have made a militiaman prior to rendezvous subject to
federal court-martial jurisdiction, it had not done so. On the other
hand, state tribunals were not prohibited from acting in such
circumstances. He concluded that the state court-martial had
92. Case 106/77, Administrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Simmenthal

SpA (No. 2), [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (1978).
93. Regina, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 892 (citing Simmenthal, [19781 3 C.M.L.R.
The reference would be to the Advocate General's
at 275-79, 283).
representations and the opinion of the Court stressing the delay which Italian
constitutional law procedures would impose upon Community proceedings.
Simmenthal, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 275-79, 283.
94. 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1820). The case is discussed at length at III-IV G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 535-41 (Paul A.
Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds. 1988).
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concurrent jurisdiction with federal court-martials empowered by
Congressional statute to try those who disobeyed the call of the
President into active service. 9'
In Houston, Justice Joseph Story dissented on the ground
that the enactment of Congressional statutes in 1795 and 1814
conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal tribunal
authorized by those acts, and hence the state was (in modern
parlance) precluded from establishing its own court-martial.96
Professor White argues persuasively that the internal
disagreements within the Supreme Court over the Houston case
reveal a question basic to the issue of concurrent sovereignty:
when Congress was given power to regulate, but it failed to do so
completely, was there then a residuary sovereignty in the states to
regulate? Despite Justice Story's strong argument for an exclusive
power in Congress that blocked any state action, the majority view
in favor of concurrent jurisdiction (and more broadly, concurrent
sovereignty), would prevail -most significantly in regard to the
Supreme Court's view of the Commerce Clause.97 Leaving the
matter open for future decisions provided both flexibility for future
Supreme Court decisions and for wise forbearance in delimiting
state power.!
Ogden v. Saunders99 is another Supreme Court decision
dealing with Congressional non-exercise of its powers. Except for
a brief time in the early years of the Marshall Court, there was no
uniform federal bankruptcy statute as authorized by the Federal
Constitution.
It thus became a question of whether state
insolvency laws, which discharged debtors from prison and
protected debtors within the state, violated the Contract Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Since the insolvency law pre-dated the
defendant's becoming indebted, there was no issue of statutory
retroactivity condemned earlier in Sturges v. Crowninshield.'0
Each Justice among the majority submitted an individual opinion,
but common to all was the view that a state insolvency proceeding
was part of the existing municipal law included by implication
within the provisions of the contract."' For practical and legal

95. Houston, 18 U.S. at 12-32.
96. Id. at 47-76.
97. See WHmTE, supra note 94, at 538-41; see also JOHNSON, supra note 4, at
160-61 (discussing Houston).
98. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 448 (1821) (elaborating upon
the enunciation of concurrency under the cloak of a supposedly exclusive

position).
99. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
100. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
101. See Ogden, 25 U.S. at 256-62 (providing Justice Washington's opinion);

id. at 285-86 (providing Justice Johnson's opinion); id. at 297-99 (providing
Justice Thompson's opinion); id. at 324-25 (providing Justice Trimble's
opinion).
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reasons, they believed that Congress's power in this field could not
Despite Chief Justice
have been intended to be exclusive. 10 2
Marshall's dissent, based on the Contract Clause and an extensive
discussion of natural rights to contract, the Court thus upheld the
existence of concurrent power in the states and the federal
government. 0 3
A third type of teleological interpretation occurs when the
European Court of Justice decides a case contrary to textual
indications in the treaty. One instance is the Les Verts v.
0
European Parliament'
case, where the Court entertained an
Article 173 (Amsterdam, art. 230) proceeding brought against the
Parliament. The relevant portion of Article 173 pre-dated a grant
of authority to the European Parliament that included
participation in the budget process. An ecological group within the
EU wished to field one or more candidates for election to the
Parliament, and felt itself aggrieved when what it considered an
inadequate fund was allocated to the Les Verts group for
However,
promulgation of information on their candidates.
despite the expanded authority of the Parliament, Article 173
(Amsterdam, art. 230) had not been amended to include the
Parliament within the EU institutions whose actions were subject
to review by the Court of Justice. The Court held that, given the
nature of the Community as a body under the rule of law, all EC
institutions, regardless of their express mention in Article 173
(Amsterdam, art. 230), should be subject to review by the Court of
Justice. This was in accord with the spirit of the EEC treaty, as
well as the general scheme to make all Community action subject
to direct challenge by those whose interests were affected. 100 While
it is arguable that the Court's decision was essential to protect a
contesting party's access to EU election funding, the broader
expression of that purpose provides justification for what might
become wide-ranging law-making authority. On the other hand,
the Court was careful to point out that procedurally, it has been
the custom to provide liberal access to the Court's jurisdiction
through a broad construction of the Treaty articles conferring

102. See id. at 280-81, 290-91 (providing Justice Johnson's opinion); id. at
305-311 (providing Justice Thompson's opinion).
103. See id. at 332-357 (providing Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion).
The case is discussed in WHITE, supra note 94, at 648-657, and in JOHNSON,
supranote 4, at 184-187.
104. Case 294/83, Partie Ecologiste "Les Verts" [The Greens] v. European

Parliament, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343 (1986).
105. Les Verts, [19871 2 C.M.L.R. at 371-72; see also WEATHERILL &
BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 179-80 (discussing Article 170 of the Maastricht
Treaty).

After considering the merits, the Court voided the budget decision,

pointing out that inequities in the award of funding to the "Les Verts"
association virtually precluded a party not represented in the Parliament from
staging an election campaign. PartieEcologiste, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 377-78.
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jurisdiction.'
Another example of the Court of Justice's purposive approach
is the case of Statens Kontrol v. Larsen,"7 where the Court
commented that Article 95 (Amsterdam, art. 90), which applies to
internal taxes that discriminate against imports, would also apply
in situations where an internal tax imposes a burden upon
exportation that is not equivalent to the impact on domestically
marketed goods."8 In other words, the Court read into Article 95 a
broad principle of neutrality applicable alike to imports and
exports. Despite the fact that Article 95 of the treaty made no
explicit reference to the taxation of exports, the Court reasoned
that the broad objectives of the treaty would be jeopardized if a
Member State were permitted to discriminate against exportation
of a scarce commodity or product. Hence, the general principal of
tax neutrality would render the Member State's tax a violation of
the treaty.
Although the Marshall Court's purposive interpretation never
went as far as the European Court of Justice in Les Verts, its
decisions do present some evidence that, given a similar
constitutional problem, it might have taken equally unorthodox
action. For example, in Peisch v. Ware, the Court dealt with the
exercise of maritime salvage jurisdiction by a Delaware state
arbitration tribunal, and affirmed the award of that body despite
the seemingly exclusive admiralty power of federal courts.' °9 In
New Jersey v. Wilson, the Court upheld on Contract Clause
grounds an exemption from state taxation, despite the fact that
neither the contracts made by colonial royal officials nor those of
the state of New Jersey were specifically included within the
Federal Constitution's Contract Clause."
Perhaps the most extreme Marshall Court trespass upon
constitutional provisions occurs in Osborne v. Bank of the United
States."' When the Second Bank of the United States was
incorporated in 1816, Congress provided that it might bring
actions in the lower federal courts by virtue of its incorporation by
Congress.'' In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall
asserted that Congress might confer upon the circuit courts
original jurisdiction in any type of case to which the Supreme
106. Id. at 374, 357-58.

107. Case 142/77, Statens Kontrol Med Aedle Metaller v. Larsen, [19791 2
C.M.L.R. 680 (1978).
108. Id. at 696-97. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 419-20

(discussing function of legislation).
109. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1807).
110. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 7,
at 598-600 (discussing New Jersey v. Wilson).
111. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 157-160
(discussing Osborne v. Bank of the United States).
112. Osborne, 22 U.S. at 817.
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Court's appellate jurisdiction extended." 3 Shortly after this broad
assertion of putative federal court jurisdiction, Marshall proceeded
to reason that, since the bank was created by federal legislation,
all of its actions depended upon federal law."' According to the
Chief Justice, the bank's right to sue stood on the same ground as
the authority of federal officials to bring actions in federal
courts."' The standing of the Bank thus rested upon its personal
status as a federal instrumentality, coupled with its activities
being per se grounds upon which to predicate federal questions.
Yet the lower federal courts did not possess federal question
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if Congress could confer federal
court jurisdiction simply by creating "federal corporations" such as
the bank, along with a grant of access to federal courts, might not
the jurisdiction of lower federal courts be vastly expanded?
Justice Johnson's dissent sharply criticized the decision as
conferring powers on the lower federal courts that were not
authorized by the Constitution.11 While it is true that the rule of
complete diversity, applicable to associations and corporations in
Marshall's day, would have barred the bank from federal courts in
virtually all cases, there seems to be no constitutional basis for
congressional action giving one banking institution access to
federal courts when it would be disabled from doing so on diversity
grounds. 7 Indeed the basis for the Bank of the United States
having this procedural advantage remains obscure in the opinion.
Either it should have had the right to sue based upon status as a
governmental entity, or as one who possessed complete diversity.
In the alternative, the Bank should, like all other "persons," have
had the right to take federal question appeals from state court
decisions. It was spurious to assert that, since the Bank was
created by federal statute, everything that it did raised a federal
question. Even more importantly, Congressional authority to
establish and make exceptions to lower federal court jurisdiction
could not reasonably be stretched to include power to confer a

113. Id. at 821. Marshall's position mirrors a general tendency to construe
federal court jurisdiction liberally. For example, this was true of diversity of
citizenship cases, and the Court leaned heavily toward the view that federal
judicial power was coterminous with the powers vested by the Constitution in
Congress. See WHITE, supra note 94, at 510-19, 528-33, 844-46 (discussing

jurisdiction).
114.
115.
116.
117.
U.S.

Osborne, 22 U.S. at 823-25.
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 871-903.
The rule of complete diversity, established in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806), required that for a diversity-based case to be

within federal court jurisdiction, all of the plaintiffs would have to possess
different citizenship than that of the defendants. Id. at 267. The rule was
extended to corporations and their shareholders in Bank of the United States
v.Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
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private right upon a banking corporation through the means of a
public law.
III. SHAPING THE

CONSTITUTION OF UNION

In 1991, the European Court of Justice felt obligated to set
forth the salient characteristics that distinguished the European
Union from the looser form of agreement represented by the treaty
erecting the European Economic Area."8 It pointed out that the
European Union was not simply a multilateral international
agreement among the Member States:
[The] EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international
agreement, none the less [sic] constitutes the constitutional charter
of a Community based on the rule of law .... The essential
characteristics of the community legal order which has thus been
established are in particular its primacy over the law of the
member-States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions
which are applicable to their nationals and to the member-States
themselves119
Very clearly in the view of the Court, the Community had
moved well beyond the status of a group of nations bound by an
international treaty to erect a free trade area for their mutual
advantage. Through the imposition of a rule of law, the Member
States by 1991 were associated in a relationship that to Americans
seems very close to our federal system, or at least, to the American
Union as it existed in the time of John Marshall.
The two principles identified in the EuropeanEconomic Area
I120 opinion are: (1) the supremacy or primacy of Community law
over the law of Member States, and (2) the direct effect of
Community law by virtue of its application against both Member
State governments and individual citizens or subjects of Member
States.
Included within the second principle is the implied
authority of citizens to demand that their State recognize rights
which accrue to them under Community laws.
118. Re The Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area (Opinion 1191),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 245, 268-69 (1991) [hereinafter European Economic Area I

Opinion].
119. Id. at 269. The language parallels that of N.V. Algemene Transport-en
Expedite Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Neder-Landse Tariefcommissie,
[1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 129 (1963), which reads as follows:
Article 177, ... confirms that the States recognised in Community law
have an authority capable of being invoked by their nationals before
those [Community and national] courts ... [Tihe Community constitutes
a new legal order in international law, for whose benefit the States have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the
subjects of which comprise not only the member-States but also their
nationals.
Community law.., not only imposes obligations on
individuals but also confers on them legal rights.
120. European Economic Area I Opinion, supra note 118, at 269.
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A. Supremacy or Primacy
The Court of Justice case which firmly established the
primacy of EC Law is Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l'Energia
Ellettrica (ENEL), which grew out of the nationalization of the
electricity industries by the Republic of Italy. 121 Flaminio Costa, a
Milanese lawyer and shareholder of one of the nationalized
companies, refused to pay his electric bill. Among other things, he
claimed that the nationalization was prohibited by a number of
provisions of the EEC Treaty. The local Italian judge, before
whom the collection action was pending, referred the EEC Treaty
issue to the Court of Justice in accordance with Article 177 (1)
(Amsterdam, art. 234[11). At the outset, the Italian government
protested that the Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction under
Article 177. It was in rejecting this contention that the Court
established the primacy of Community law over Member State
legislation:
[Tihe member-States, albeit within limited spheres, have restricted
their sovereign rights and created a body of law applicable both to
their nationals and to themselves. The reception, within the laws of
each member-State of provisions having a Community source, and
more particularly of the terms and of the spirit of the Treaty, has as
a corollary the impossibility, for the member-State, to give
preference to a unilateral and subsequent measure against a legal
order accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity ....
[O]bligations
undertaken under the Treaty creating the European Community
would not be unconditional, but merely potential if they could be
affected12 2by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories of the
Treaty.

Hence, rights created by treaty law might not be contradicted
by subsequent national legislation or governmental action. It is
significant that the EEC Treaty does not provide in express terms
that Community law shall
be supreme or have primacy over
123
Member State legislation.

The primacy of Community law is also asserted in regard to
national procedural rules which would delay an individual's
recovery. In the Simmenthal case, an inspection fee was imposed
by the Italian revenue authorities, and the taxpayer asserted that
121. Case C-6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica (ENEL),
[1964] C.M.L.R. Part 12, 425, 426, 436 (1964). After amendment of the EEA
Treaty provisions, and specific provisions were made for the European Court
of Justice to be the sole ruling authority in regard to interpretation of EC law,
the Court advised that the second treaty be adopted by the Community. Re
The Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area (Opinion 1/92), [1992] 2
C.M.L.R. 217, 217-41 (1992) [hereinafter European Economic Area II Opinion].
122. Costa, [1964] C.M.L.R. Part 12 at 455.
123. See discussion supra note 83 (comparing the Costa case to McCulloch v.
Maryland in terms of their similar reference to an underlying purpose of their
respective unions).
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the fee violated Article 12 (Amsterdam, art. 25), dealing with
tariffs and like charges.12 The matter was referred by the trial
judge for a preliminary hearing under Article 177 (1) (Amsterdam,
art. 234 [1]), but the Italian government objected that issues of
constitutionality were reserved for its national Constitutional
Court. The European Court of Justice disagreed, pointing out that
EC Regulations had an immediate (direct) effect, and that
deferring the taxpayer's recovery until the Italian Constitutional
Court acted would upset the uniform application of the Regulation
throughout the Community. It would also deny the taxpayer
rights which accrued to him immediately upon the Regulation
taking effect. Thus, the constitutional procedures of Italy could
not delay the consideration of the taxpayer's case, and the
preliminary reference was a valid means of asserting those rights.
The trial court was bound to apply EC law rather than its national
procedures for determining constitutional issues.125
The parallel implications of Costa and Simmenthal for the
European Court of Justice and McCulloch v. Maryland26 for the
Marshall Court are obvious. Unlike Costa, McCulloch involved a
direct confrontation between the tax authorities of Maryland and
the Bank of the United States, acting on behalf of the federal
government.
Arguing for the state of Maryland, Joseph
Hopkinson asserted that before a branch Bank of the United
States might be established in a given state, the government of
that state should assent to the establishment. Furthermore, the
branch bank upon establishment should become subject to the
general laws regulating or taxing the conduct of a banking
business. He observed that in international law, "a sovereign who
places his property in the territory of another sovereign, submits it
to the demands of the revenue, which are but justly paid, in return
for the protection afforded to the property."'27
The Chief Justice took pains to establish legitimacy for
federal supremacy, pointing out that federal power emanated from
all of the people of the United States. It would be inequitable to
permit a portion of those people residing in one state to limit the
actions of the federal government. It resulted from the very
nature of the Union that the United States government, "though
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action."'28
Indeed, the Supremacy Clause in Article VI confirmed this very
principle.2 9 In reason and by constitutional mandate, supremacy
124. Case 106/77, Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
SpA (No. 2), [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (1978).
125. Id. at 282-83.
126. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
127. Id. at 341.
128. Id. at 405. See also id. at 402-05 (discussing federal supremacy).

129. Id. at 405-06.
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belonged to the United States government when it acted within its
constitutional powers.
As far as state-taxing power was
concerned, the supremacy of the federal government, coupled with
the authority invested in it by all of the people of the United
States, made it unreasonable to allow the state government to
obstruct or halt the work of the federal government through the
state's local taxing power.1
In Costa, supremacy, or primacy, was inferred from the
nature of the Community and from the specific transfers of power
inherent in the terms of the Treaty of Rome." 1 More specifically,
the express provisions leading to conformity of national law to EC
law were evidence of the erection of a Community in which all
national law was subordinate.
In van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, the issue was complicated by the
fact that the Dutch constitution was involved in the question of
Community supremacy. 12 Article 66 of the Dutch Constitution
provided that provisions of a treaty would prevail over national
law when the convention's clauses had a "general compulsory
effect" -that is they were self-executing and directly applicable in
Dutch law. Pointing out that excepting constitutional provisions
from EC law primacy would defeat the uniform development of
Community law, the Advocate General successfully urged the
Court to both assert the direct impact of the EEC Treaty and to
declare that constitutional law of the Member States was also
'
subordinate to Community law. 33
30

B. Direct Effect of Community and Federal Law
In both the Community and the United States, there is a close
relationship between supremacy or primacy, on one hand, and the
direct effect of Community/federal law on the other. In van Gend
en Loos, the Court of Justice was required to pay particular
attention to the direct effect that Community provisions on tariffs
would have upon Dutch administrative and judicial proceedings.
It rejected the contention that Articles 169 and 170 (Amsterdam,
arts. 226 and 227), authorizing Community and Member State
action against unilateral change in tariffs, provided an adequate
remedy. The argument by the Netherlands government -that
Article 177 (1) (Amsterdam art. 234 [1]) authorizing references
from a national court to the European Court of Justice was
unnecessary- was summarily rejected. The Court of Justice was
130. Id. at 427-32.

See JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 142-47 (discussing in

detail the arguments of counsel and Marshall's reply).
131. Costa, [1964] C.M.L.R. Part 12 at 425.
132. N.V. Algemene Transport van Gend en Loos v. En Expedite
Onderneming Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, [1963] C.M.L.R. Part 6, 105
(1963).
133. Id. at 113-15, 119, 129.
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quite specific that Article 12 (Amsterdam, art. 25) created rights
within private individuals, and that those rights were to be
protected in the courts of Member States.
Just as Article VI of the United States Constitution included
recognition of federal supremacy, it also provided for the
application of federal law in the courts of the American states.
The third clause of Article VI, Section 2, provides that, "[Tihe
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Mindful that the Constitution extended federal
judicial power to all cases which involved the Constitution of the
United States, statutes made thereunder, and all treaties made by
the authority of the United States, the first Congress provided for
appeals to the United States Supreme Court in most situations
13 4
where "federal questions" were decided by state courts.
Consequently, the main work of the Marshall Court involved
defining when such "federal question" appeals were authorized by
the Constitution and by the Judiciary Act.
Appeals from state courts construing the provisions of treaties
entered into by the United States were among the most significant
cases decided by the Supreme Court. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee35
squarely presented the validity of such appeals. Justice Story's
opinion for the Court struck themes not unlike those considered by
the European Court of Justice a century and a half later. The
supremacy of United States treaties was included within the
constitutional grant of authority to the federal government, and
there was a pressing need that there be uniform interpretation of
treaty terms throughout the nation. Thus, the Supreme Court
performed a critical function in implementing rules of
international law through appellate review of state court
decisions. Of course, "federal question" appellate review of state
court decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court is subject to far greater
delays than apply to Article 177 (Amsterdam, art. 234)
preliminary references and the Simmenthal case.'36
In implementing its appellate review in this area, the
Marshall Court assumed to itself the authority to make unilateral
determinations of state law that were the basis for a treaty-right
claim. That had been done in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee," where the Marshall Court held that confiscation of the
Fairfax estate required a judicial proceeding under Virginia law
before the seizure was completed. Since that had not occurred
before ratification of the 1783 Peace Treaty or the ratification of
the 1794 Jay Treaty with Britain, elimination of the Fairfax title
134.
135.
136.
137.

Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
See discussion supra note 93 (discussing the Simmenthal case).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 622-23 (1813).
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was contrary to the 1783 Treaty's non-forfeiture provision. In a
similar case, Smith v. Maryland,'38 the Supreme Court examined
Maryland law and decided that the seizure did not require a
judicial finding, and hence was completed prior to the effective
date of the treaty. For this reason, the realty in Smith was not
subject to recovery by its former British owner.
The force of Article VI supremacy was diluted by the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which became effective in
1798. When coupled with the vestiges of state sovereign immunity
barring citizens from bringing action against their own state, the
Eleventh Amendment might well have been broadly construed to
preclude a state's involuntary appearance before the U.S. Supreme
Court except as defendant in an action brought by a sister state or
a foreign nation. The Marshall Court's opinion in Cohens v.
Virginia narrowly construed the Eleventh Amendment by
distinguishing between the state as a defendant, and thus
protected by the Amendment, and the state as an appellee in a
federal question appeal. 39 Cohens also demonstrated the scope of
review under the Judiciary Act of 1789, permitting federal
question review of any decision that was the conclusion of the
highest state court having jurisdiction. "'
As a consequence, no
state might so structure its court system to isolate lower court
federal question decisions from appellate review by the U.S.
Supreme Court."'
C. Legal Foundationsfor the Common Markets
Chief Justice Marshall and his Supreme Court colleagues
recognized the need to create a federal state that encouraged
internal trade and provided the enforcement mechanisms that
would ensure commercial activity among the American states.
This involved, first and foremost, forming federal legal doctrine
and institutions that would ensure the safety of private capital
invested in interstate trade. Guided in part by provisions in the
Constitution, and in part by their own acquaintance with the
needs of merchants and financiers, the Justices drew upon the
commerce clause and the Contract Clause as the preeminent tools
for the protection of private property and free trade. Included
within that system for security of private property was the
establishment of a stable currency and a related, albeit extraconstitutional, system of national banking. To a lesser degree the
Marshall Court was drawn into the task of stabilizing or
prohibiting state-sponsored extensions of credit through land-bank

138.
139.
140.
141.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 305-06 (1810).
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 395, 397-98, 405, 414-15 (1821),
Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 410-12.
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credit schemes and various other state-originated forms of
indebtedness. Hampered by the lack of a uniform bankruptcy law,
the Supreme Court nevertheless examined state insolvency laws
with an eye toward their overall impact on interstate trade and
commercial credit. Disturbed by irregularities in negotiable
instruments law, the Court spent a great deal of time reshaping
the irregular laws of the District of Columbia, and in the circuit
142
courts seems to have attempted the same for the various states.
What about the European Court of Justice? At the outset it is
readily apparent that the EC treaties provide a far more extensive
mechanism for achieving what the Europeans term "economic
integration." However, this has not preempted the. Court from
utilizing a broad teleological approach to enhance what appear to
be rather sweeping measures to restrict Member State
protectionism. For example, we have already noted the Court's
expansion of Article 95 (Amsterdam, art. 90) to limit Member
State taxation on exports, despite the lack of an explicit treaty
14
3
provision concerning such a trade limitation practice.
Traditional taxation policies of Member States have resulted in
demands that the Court review the economic impact of such
variant policies upon Community integration.
One glaring
example is the litigation triggered by differing rates of customs
duties and excise taxes upon wines, beer, and other alcoholic
beverages. Even a cursory glance at the Court's diligence in this
area will convince Americans that the Twenty-First Amendment,
relegating liquor control and most related law enforcement activity
to the states, was a wise, albeit "non-integrating" solution. 44 On
the other hand, the wide disparity in taxation systems among the
EC Member States makes it necessary to impose rather detailed
controls upon the ability of Member States to impose taxation
upon alcoholic beverages.
In the European Union even bureaucratic delay can be
tantamount to a Member State breaching Article 30 (Amsterdam,
art. 28), which ostensibly prohibits the establishment of quotas on
the importation of foreign goods. Even when legal provisions
provide equal treatment for imported postal meters, a consistent
practice of administrative obstruction to such importation will
violate Community norms and subject the Member State to Article
169 (Amsterdam, art. 226) proceedings by the European

142. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 190-223 (discussing private law
in the Supreme Court); HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 559-87

(discussing business enterprise and the Supreme Court); WHITE, supra note
94, at 595-673, 794-835 (discussing Contract Clause cases).
143. See supra text accompanying note 108 (discussing Statens Kontrol v.
Larsen).
144. See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 401-14, 425-26, 438
(discussing Article 36).
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Commission. 4" The thread running through the Court of Justice's
work in these areas is that it is the economic impact of the
Member State action that determines its acceptability, rather than
the form of the action.
Although there are parallels between the Marshall Court's
enhancement of conditions favoring interstate commerce, and the
European Court's more ambitious (and more effective) efforts
toward the elimination of all trade barriers and all discriminatory
Member State practices, it is quite clear that the complexities of
modern commercial regulation render the two situations not
readily comparable. On the other hand, the European Court's
focus upon the potential economic impact of Member State laws
does reflect a similar rationale in the Marshall Court's decisions in
4 6 and Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Brown v. Maryland'
Marsh
47
Company.
The Brown decision enunciated the "original
package" doctrine to protect goods in international and interstate
trade from taxation other than by the state of ultimate
destination. In Willson, the economic value of damming a tidal
creek was balanced against the waterway's negligible impact on
the conduct of interstate or foreign trade. Arguably, both decisions
were based upon economic impact rather than recourse to formal
legal principles. That emphasis upon the actual effect of state (or
Member State) measures seems to be the focal point of the
Marshall Court's work as well as the efforts of the European Court
of Justice.
D. Protectionof Central Court Jurisdiction
Both the Marshall Court and the European Court of Justice
have demonstrated diligence in protecting their own authority
within their respective federal systems. This is a natural byproduct of the doctrine of supremacy expressed in the United
States Constitution, and found by the Court of Justice to be
inherent in the treaties creating the European Union."" The
exercise of judicial review over state legislation and court decisions
pre-dates the Constitution, and finds its origins in review of
colonial laws and judicial decisions by the Judicial Committee of
the British Privy Council.'49
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee," ° Justice Joseph Story pointed
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 439-40.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
See discussion supra note XYZ (parenthetical).

149. See generally JOSEPH H. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM
THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (Octagon Books, Inc. 1965) (1950); ELMER B.
RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL
(Octagon Books, Inc. 1976) (1915).
150. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The case is discussed in JOHNSON, supra
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to the need for Supreme Court resolution of disputes involving
"federal questions," that is, cases in which the validity of the
Constitution, federal statutes, or treaties of the United States, was
denied.
Citing the Supremacy Clause, he emphasized the
responsibility of state judges as well as federal judges to decide
cases not merely according to state law, but also according to the
paramount federal law."' He asserted that the framers of the
Constitution anticipated that state tribunals would have to decide
cases involving federal questions, and they also anticipated that
federal judicial power would have to extend to those cases. In
situations where federal courts did not exercise original
jurisdiction, the Founding Fathers must have anticipated that the
Supreme Court of the United States would apply federal judicial
power by appellate review of state court decisions that trespassed
federal concerns. 52 Furthermore, the need for uniformity in
interpretation of the Constitution was essential, requiring federal
judicial power to resolve conflicts between federal question
decisions of the various state courts. 53
Although theories of the Union played a significant role in
Martin, and state sovereignty was a matter of debate not only
between Story and Johnson, but also in the political arena, the
actual status of the states as party litigants before the Supreme
Court was not brought into question. Cohens v. Virginia,'" an
appeal of a Virginia criminal prosecution, raised the issue directly
five years later. The Commonwealth of Virginia contended that,
while a sovereign state might be made a party in an original
jurisdiction Supreme Court case, the Eleventh Amendment
prevented the Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction when
the state was a party.155 At the outset of his opinion for the Court,
note 4, at 68-72, and in WHITE, supra note 94, at 165-73, 495-504.
151. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 338-40.
152. Id. at 342.
153. Id. at 347-48. In his concurring opinion, Justice William Johnson
pointed out that in Martin the Supreme Court exercised appellate jurisdiction
over the parties, and thus did not subordinate the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals to its mandate. While he was willing to assert that the need for such
review of state court decisions was essential to the continuance of the Union,
he denied that the scope of federal judicial power was as extensive as set forth
by Story. Id. at 364, 372-80.
154. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). The case is discussed in WHITE, supra
note 94, at 504-20; JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 75-77, 152-54; and CURRIE,
supra note 41, at 96-102. Professor Currie accuses Marshall of emphasizing
the intolerable consequences of a contrary decision, and of reaching out for
issues not necessarily presented. He asserts that "the strength of Cohens, like
that of Marbury, lies in convincing the reader that the Framers were too wise
and too patriotic to have created an imperfect Constitution," Id. at 102.
Perhaps so, or is this just an example of a "purposive" argument?
155. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 300-01, 304-07 (discussing Philip
Barbour's arguments for defendant in error).
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Marshall distinguished between federal jurisdiction of cases
arising under the Constitution and statutes of the United States,
and federal jurisdiction conferred by the status of the parties. He
pointed out that the first level of jurisdiction was granted without
restriction or qualification in the Constitution, and for that reason,
it would not be appropriate to make an exception when a state was
a party to the litigation.'56 For the welfare of the Union, and in
accordance with the needs expressed by the Supremacy Clause,
federal judicial authority was essential to answer definitively
those questions that might arise concerning the Constitution and
laws of the United States.
No government ought to be so defective in its organization, as not to
contain within itself the means of securing the execution of its own
laws against other dangers than those which occur every day.
Courts of justice are the means most usually employed; and it is
reasonable to expect that a government should repose on its own
Courts, rather than on others. 57
Turning to the Eleventh Amendment, Marshall observed that
its text limited the authority of federal courts to hear cases
"commenced or prosecuted" against a state by a citizen of another
state. However, in Cohens, the prosecution was commenced by
Virginia, and the appeal of the case by writ of error did not alter
the relationship of the parties. In federal practice, when the
United States was a party in an appealed case, it had never been
held that the suit was, by the issuance of a writ of error, changed
into an invalid proceeding against the United States.'
The
remainder of the Chief Justice's opinion was devoted to a
restatement of the principle in Martin's Lessee -that the United
States was supreme, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
exercise appellate review over cases decided by state courts in
which the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States
were brought into question and their validity was, by the state
court, denied.'59
A third Marshall Court case that deserves attention is United
States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 6° which finally resolved the longstanding debate over whether there was a federal common law of
crimes. In an opinion by Justice William Johnson, the Court
decided that all federal criminal sanctions had to be based upon
the Constitution and statutes, and not upon common law. This
was inherent in the limited nature of the federal government, and
156. Id. at 378-79, 382-83, 390-92.
157. Id. at 378-79, 382-83, 390-92.
158. Id. at 407-12.
159. Id. at 407-12.
160. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). The case is discussed in JOHNSON, supra
note 4, at 141-42; HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 354-56, 639-46; and
WHITE, supra note 94, at 137-38, 450, 865-66.
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more specifically pertinent to the limitation of federal court
jurisdiction. A contrary decision would lead to the speculation
16 1
that there were implied judicial powers in the federal courts.
Although Justice Johnson was willing to admit the existence of
some implied judicial powers, he was emphatic that this was not
the case when criminal laws were involved. United States v.
Hudson and Goodwin is an important case for placing federal
court jurisdiction within the context of limited federal government.
It left open for future consideration the possibility that there
might be a federal common law outside the area of crimes, and
ultimately led to a sharp restriction upon the development of a
federal common law articulated in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins. 6 ' As such, the case checked the expansion of federal
judicial power in the controversial area of common law crimes, and
thus eliminated continuing partisan conflict between the Court,
the political branches of the federal government, and the states
who held primary responsibility for criminal law enforcement.
Like the Marshall Court, the European Court of Justice has
been alert to protecting and expanding its jurisdiction. However,
the treaty provisions establishing the Community give much more
detailed guidance concerning the jurisdiction of the Court than
does the United States Constitution in Article III. The European
Court has general authority to judicially review all Community
acts under Article 173 (Amsterdam, art. 230); it may also review
legislative and administrative inaction by the Council or the
Commission under Article 175 (Amsterdam, art. 232).163 As we
noted earlier, the European Court asserted its jurisdiction to
review an act of the European Parliament, even though this head
of jurisdiction was omitted from Article 173.
The Court's
justification was that, when Article 173 was ratified, the
Parliament did not exist, and that, in any event, the rule of law
demanded that all Community institutions be subject to review
concerning the congruence of their acts to the treaties establishing
6
the Community.!
Individual natural and legal persons may also
sue under Article 173 when the issue is of "direct and individual
161. Hudson, 11 U.S. at 33-34.
162. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
163. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 132.
164. Id. at 128-29. In Case 294/83, PartieEcologiste "Les Verts"[The
Greens] v. EuropeanParliament,[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343, 370 (1986), the court

cited its general authority as custodian of Community law, as well as the spirit
of Article 173 (Amsterdam, art. 230), to hold that no Community institution,
including Parliament, should be exempt from judicial review of its activities.

The defect in Article 173 was remedied in the Maastricht Treaty amendments
to Community law. Conversely, while Parliament prior to Maastricht did not

have an unqualified right to sue in the Court, the Court agreed that
Parliament might bring suit to protect its prerogatives. See BROWN &
KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 132-33.
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concern" to them. Brown and Kennedy suggest that the Court of
Justice is reluctant to permit corporations and other "legal
persons" to sue under this provision, but that natural persons
affected by a Community institution's decision and who are under
compulsion to comply, or who have taken part in the earlier
proceedings, will be permitted to ask the Court to annul.'65
Annulment actions are not only limited to certain parties
having standing, but they also are subject to a short statute of
limitations. Consequently, the bulk of individual challenges to
Community actions are made indirectly in Member State courts
through an Article 177 (Amsterdam, art. 234) reference to the
Court of Justice. In many ways Article 177 operates as did Section
25 of the Judiciary Act in John Marshall's day. It ensures the
uniform application of Community law by referring questions to
the European Court of Justice.'66 In accepting cases for review the
Court has been generous in exercising jurisdiction, asserting that
it is beyond its function to make an initial determination of
whether the reference is necessary or whether EC law is really
involved. Similarly, the Court has broadly interpreted what bodies
are "courts or tribunals" which may refer questions under Article
177 (Amsterdam, art. 234).167 Finally, the European Court has
concluded that when there is no appeal from the decision of a court
or tribunal, that body is subject to the mandatory referral
requirements of Article 177 (3) (Amsterdam, art. 234).
The European Court of Justice demonstrates both the
constitutional authority and the institutional willingness to use to
the fullest the judicial review powers granted by the treaty. Its
Justices have not been reticent about using teleological
interpretive techniques to expand the scope of their authority.
Thus their Court, not unlike the Marshall Court, has shown a
centralizing, and self-enhancing, tendency in its jurisdictional
decisions.
The Court of Justice has also been sensitive to threats to its
authority.
Its reaction to attempts to establish a European
Economic Area (EEA) Court illustrates the way in which the Court
of Justice views legislative or diplomatic efforts to introduce new
judicial systems that are independent of the EC, but nevertheless
interrelated with it. The European Economic Area included both
Member States of the EC and non-Member States who were
willing to join a common market area, but were reluctant to take
upon themselves some of the sovereignty waivers required by the
EC. The original EEA treaty created a system of courts for the
165. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 133-42; see also
WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 21, at 227-46 (discussing judicial
review of EC acts).
166. See BROWN AND KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 198-99.
167. Id. at 202-13.
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settlement of disputes between Member States, which might
include Member States of the EC. It provided that rulings of the
new court were to conform to decisions of the Court of Justice
made prior to the signature of the agreement creating the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Furthermore, the new
court would consist of eight judges, of whom five would be drawn
from the European Court of Justice. In the EEA Court of First
Instance, consisting of five judges, two would also be judges of the
EC's Court of First Instance. Finally, the Agreement provided a
procedure by which the new EFTA Court might ask the European
Court of Justice to give advisory opinions concerning the EFTA
Agreement.
In rejecting the validity of the original EFTA Agreement, the
Court of Justice pointed out that, despite the similarity of
structure of powers between it and the EFTA Court, there could
easily be a divergence of interpretation of EC law, creating serious
questions concerning the authority of the Court of Justice. In
addition, the EC treaty provided that the European Court would
have exclusive jurisdiction, and this would conflict with a sharing
of decision-making with the EFTA Court. The functioning of EC
judges in the EFTA Court, far from contributing to coordination,
might prejudice their independent judgment should the same
matter be brought before the Court of Justice, or the Court of First
Instance, for decision." 8 To save the EFTA Agreement, some
changes were instituted, including eliminating the provision for
EC judges to sit in EFTA courts. New procedures were instituted
for settlement of disputes within the EFTA, and the EC Court of
Justice might be requested to render rulings on the EFTA
Agreement and its construction.
A joint committee was
established to coordinate EC law with that of the EEA, and in the
event of conflict, the EC law (as construed by the Court of Justice)
was to prevail. Finally, the provision that the EC Court of Justice
was to pay attention to decisions of other courts was deleted from
the EEA Agreement. Given these concessions, the European
Court of Justice concluded that the EEA Agreement was
compatible with the EC treaty.'69
CONCLUSIONS
Constitutional courts in emerging federal systems play a
critical role in shaping the jural relationships between subordinate
political units and the union government of which the courts are
component parts. They also delineate the degree to which central

168. Id. at 232-38; European Economic Area I, supra note 118, at 267-73.
169. Id. at 238-240. See European Economic Area II Opinion, supra note
121, at 237-39 (setting forth the second decision).
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laws may act upon individual citizens of the component states,
utilizing principles of supremacy and "direct effect" to insure that
the basic principles of union are enforceable at the level of
component states. It is also the responsibility of the central
constitutional courts to implement rules that effectively advance
the goals for which the union has been established. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice
have been extremely effective in laying down legal rules that have
led to the development of extremely prosperous common markets.
In many ways, the European Union seems to have profited from
the American experience, and EC standards eliminating
mercantile and protectionist policies within the Union have been
more precisely drawn and more vigorously enforced by Community
institutions. Specifically, Article 177 (Amsterdam, art. 234) is a
widely used and effective tool by which individual citizens can
utilize the European Court to protect themselves against their own
Member State actions. The Marshall Court, in protecting federal
question review, provided a similar, albeit, much more
cumbersome and time-consuming, method for citizens to challenge
their state governments.
In judicial decision-making, both courts demonstrated
flexibility and creativity in implementing teleological, or
purposive, decision-making. This is supplemented by use of a
contextual method, examining the "four corners" of their
constitutional documents to determine the intention of the
draftsmen or the underlying principles of the document. Both
have recognized that their work is critical to the efficient operation
of their federal system. As a consequence, they are alert to the
need to maintain judicial independence from the political branches
of their central governments, and despite their natural tendency to
advance federal interests, have been sensitive to the
countervailing demands of component states. In this regard, the
European Court has already been influenced by the decentralizing
impact of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, and the
Marshall Court (perhaps after 1830) was reflecting a
decentralizing influence in American political and legal life.
Given the citation practices of European courts, it is not
surprising that no reference to Marshall's Court has been located
in the judgments of the European Court of Justice. There is also a
conspicuous lack of reference to Canadian and Australian judicial
work dealing with federal systems and the role of courts in the
exposition of the law and principles of federalism. Undoubtedly
much of this material is known by the Justices, advocates general
and staff of the Court of Justice. The historical challenge of
building a new federal state which confronted John Marshall and
his colleagues, has become commonplace in today's world of
nations, and much that was once new about federalism and the
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authority of central courts is now generally accepted knowledge.
Yet the nature of federalism and the functions of central courts
within federal or quasi-federal systems seem to have remained
fairly constant over the past two centuries.

